**GLBL 871: Boko Haram: Defining a Path to Reintegration**

***Reintegration Model Template***

**Model Name**

The Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) created by former President Umaru Musa Yar’adua   
**Country**

Nigeria

**Time Period**

2009-2016

**Insurgency Description**

Niger Delta militant groups affiliated with the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, including the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and Niger Delta Vigilante. Targeted over 20,000 militias. Long held grievances including poverty, underdevelopment, pollution, and resource control contributed to the insurgency.

**Civilian Agency Involvement**

Federal government agencies were directly led the Presidential Amnesty Program. Other agencies, including the Niger Delta Development Commission and Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs support the amnesty implementation.

**Military Involvement**

Nigerian military was not directly involved in the amnesty program. However, Joint Task Force were deployed throughout the Niger Delta region during the amnesty implementation.

**International Agency/Expert Involvement**

The model mirrored previous models in post-conflict zones. The Nigerian government solicited the input of other governments, the academic community, and/or the UN. When it was launched, it was welcomed with cautious optimism by the international community, including the International Crisis Group

**NGO Involvement**

The Presidential Amnesty Program leveraged the resources of the local civil society organizations in job training and community reintegration.

**Impetus for Reintegration**

Niger Delta region produces over 90% of the Nigerian crude oil, a major source of country’s GDP and foreign currency. Attacks by the militias on the oil pipelines and kidnappings of the oil company expatriate workers drastically cut into the country’s revenue.

**Criteria for Reintegration**

Militants who surrendered arms, give up insurgency and registered with the government qualified for the Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP)

**Prosecution/Punitive Component**

Militants who surrendered arms and give up insurgency were granted presidential amnesty

**Community Engagement**

Little or no community attitude assessment was conducted. The way the Presidential Amnesty Program was conceived was highly controversial devoid of any community engagement.This led to competing priorities, conflict of interests, and accusation of corruption.

**Reconciliation, Social & Political Elements**

No, reconciliation, social & political elements were not addressed in the Presidential Amnesty Program. Underlying factors that led to the insurgency were unresolved.

**Incentives**

The former militants were offered cash payments of 65,000 Naira monthly alongside vocational trainings. The incentives inflated the number of so-called militants because the cash payments were considered to be a bonanza. Many unemployed youths showed up as for militants.

**Follow-up**

The program succeeded in reducing attacks on the oil pipelines and kidnapping of oil workers. However, the program failed in the reintegration in part due to the cost of the program as well as lack of political will and corruption. The recent attacks and resurgence of the militant groups in the region offer evidence of failed integration.

**Cost Estimate**

There was no official cost estimate, but figures floated in July 2009 pegged the budget at 50-52 billion Naira ($145 Million)

**Financing**

The federal government paid for the reintegration program.

**Results/Metrics**

Government publications on the results of the program are unreliable because the information cannot be substantiated.

**Lessons Learned**

In the short term, it worked in reducing pipeline attacks and kidnapping of oil workers. However, the program failed in the reintegration and rehabilitation because it did not address underlying factors that led to the insurgency. The lessons learned includes flaws in design, implementation, monitoring, political will, and leadership.

**Applicability to Boko Haram**

Niger Delta insurgency is not comparable to Boko Haram because the latter attacked government and private institutions as well as civilians in a large scale. With thousands of lives lost and millions displaced, it would be difficult for any President to grant amnesty or presidential pardon. However, some combination of punishment measures could be applicable combined with rehabilitation and reintegration programs for Boko haram fighters.

**Bibliography**

Make sure to include the sources you researched as part of your report!